Indiana Journal of Law and Social
Equality
Volume 3

Issue 2

Article 6

Spring 5-8-2015

Fracking and the Rural Poor: Negative Externalities, Failing
Remedies, and Federal Legislation
Matthew Castelli
mpcastel@indiana.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijlse
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Health Law and Policy
Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, and the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Castelli, Matthew (2015) "Fracking and the Rural Poor: Negative Externalities, Failing Remedies, and
Federal Legislation," Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality: Vol. 3 : Iss. 2 , Article 6.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijlse/vol3/iss2/6

This Student Note is brought to you for free and open
access by the Law School Journals at Digital Repository
@ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality by an
authorized editor of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For
more information, please contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

Indiana Journal
of Law and Social Equality
Volume 3: Issue 2

Fracking and the Rural Poor:
Negative Externalities, Failing Remedies, and
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Note by Matthew Castelli*

Introduction
Hydraulic fracturing1 may have a bright future, but many Americans are
stuck in its shadow. For all of fracking’s potential to provide jobs and energy, its
current operations are imperfect. Pollution, adverse health effects, erosion, seismic
activity, and water contamination have all been linked to fracking activities.2 Much
of this country’s fracking occurs in poorer, rural areas, and the centralization of
fracking’s ills in these locales raises environmental justice concerns. As the rural
poor often have limited access to legal assistance, the regulation of fracking should
ensure an equitable balance between protecting their interests and promoting a
healthy energy industry.
This Note first argues that the lower class is burdened with the lion’s share
of fracking’s negative externalities. It then asserts that comprehensive federal
regulation is needed, as current legal remedies are insufficient to internalize these
costs. This Note (1) describes the negative externalities of fracking; (2) shows
how they disproportionately affect members of the lower class; (3) evinces the
failures of current legal regimes; and (4) explains how federal legislation can help
internalize fracking’s negative externalities. This Note is not a comparison of the
benefits and detriments associated with fracking, and it does not take a position on
* Indiana University Maurer School of Law, J.D. expected 2015; University of Richmond, B.S.
Biology 2011. I would like to extend special thanks to Kayleen Glaser for her help with this Note.
1. This note refers to hydraulic fracturing as “fracking,” one of the process’s many shorthands.
2. See, e.g., N.Y. Dep’t of Health, A Public Health Review of High Volume Hydraulic
Fracturing for Shale Gas Development 4 (2014); Hannah J. Wiseman, Risk and Response in
Fracturing Policy, 84 U. Colo. L. Rev. 729, 736 (2013).
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the merits of fracking. It simply recognizes the negative externalities present in
fracking operations and proposes a legal framework for internalization that is fair
to both the gas industry and the American people.
I.

Hydraulic Fracturing and Its Negative Externalities
A. Background on Hydraulic Fracturing

Fracking is a method of oil and natural gas extraction used in low-permeability
rock formations such as shale and coal.3 It has succeeded conventional drilling
techniques in areas with these geological characteristics. Fracking injects highly
pressurized fluid composed of water, sand, and chemicals into rock formations.4 The
pressure cracks the formations, and the sand acts as a proppant.5 The sand holds the
microfissures open and allows petroleum products to flow to the production well.6
This technique extracts resources that are referred to as “unconventional,” because
they are located in formations that were previously inaccessible.7 The integration
of horizontal drilling8 and fracking is responsible for the recent boom in natural gas
extraction,9 and the increase in estimated U.S. oil and natural gas reserves.10 The
U.S. Energy Information Administration estimated that natural gas extracted by
fracking will double in the next decade11 and that it will account for approximately
eighty percent of all domestic natural gas development within that time.12
B. Hydraulic Fracturing Creates Negative Externalities
A negative externality is a cost imposed on someone external to an activity
rather than on the parties that decided to engage in the activity. In the present context,
neighbors of landowners who engage in fracking are burdened with harms from
the activity. Many of the negative externalities from fracking are associated with
3. Richard K. Lattanzio, Cong. Research. Serv., R42833, Air Quality Issues in Natural
Gas Systems 1 (2013).
4. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Modern Shale Gas Development in the United States: A Primer
ES-4 (2009), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/03/f0/ShaleGasPrimer_Online_4-2009.
pdf.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Cong. Research. Serv., R42833 at 1−2.
8. This technique allows well operators to drill horizontally and to expand the area reached
by fracking operations for a single well.
9. See Cong. Research. Serv., R42833 at 1.
10. Id.
11. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Annual Energy Outlook 2013 with Projections to 2040, at
74 (2013).
12. Cong. Research. Serv., R42833 at 1.
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three main categories of pollution: water, air, and land. Each devalues affected
properties13 and has the potential to cause adverse health effects.14 For example,
a study in rural Colorado analyzed 124,842 births from 1996 to 2009 and found
that newborns from houses closest to natural gas operations had a thirty percent
increase in congenital heart conditions.15 The newborns’ chance of developing
neural tube defects also increased by one hundred percent.16
i. Water Contamination
Water contamination can result when fracking causes methane, sediment,
or fracking fluid to migrate into an aquifer space.17 Methane contamination
is responsible for the often-televised footage of individuals lighting their tap
water on fire,18 and sediment-filled drinking water is equally unpotable. A study
of fracking communities in Appalachia found methane in eighty-two percent of
drinking water samples and found that concentrations of methane and ethane
were six times and twenty-three times higher in homes close to natural gas
wells, respectively.19
Fracking fluid has the potential to contaminate sources of drinking water.
Of the two to four million gallons of fracking fluid injected underground during
the fracking process,20 only fifteen to twenty percent returns to the surface as
“produced water” or “flowback.”21 The remainder is left underground, and
significant disagreement exists regarding where these millions of gallons go
13. See BBC Research & Consulting, Measuring the Impact of Coalbed Methane Wells on
Property Values 1−2 (Nov. 12, 2001) (BBC Research & Consulting, Working Paper), http://
www.bbcresearch.com/reports/Impact%20of%20Coalbed%20Methane%20Wells%20on%20
Property%20Values.pdf.
14. See Theo Colborn, Carol Kwiatkowski, Kim Schultz & Mary Bachran, Natural Gas
Operations from a Public Health Perspective, 17 Hum. & Ecological Risk Assessment 1039,
1039 (2011), http://cce.cornell.edu/EnergyClimateChange/NaturalGasDev/Documents/PDFs/
fracking%20chemicals%20from%20a%20public%20health%20perspective.pdf.
15. Lisa M. McKenzie, Ruixin Guo, Roxana Z. Witter, David A. Savitz, Lee S. Newman &
John L. Adgate, Birth Outcomes and Maternal Residential Proximity to Natural Gas Development in Rural Colorado, 122 Envtl. Health Persp. 412 (2014).
16. Id. at 414.
17. See, N.Y. Dep’t of Health, supra note 2, at 5; Wiseman, supra note 2, at 736.
18. See GasLand (HBO television broadcast 2010).
19. Robert B. Jackson, Avner Vengosh, Thomas H. Darrah, Nathaniel R. Warner, Adrian
Down, Robert J. Poreda, Stephen G. Osborn, Kaiguang Zhao & Johnathan D. Karr, Increased
Stray Gas Abundance in a Subset of Drinking Water Wells Near Marcellus Shale Gas Extraction, 110 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 11250, 11250 (2013).
20. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, supra note 4, at ES-4.
21. Ohio Dept. of Nat. Res., Wastewater (Flowback) from Hydraulic Fracturing, http://
oilandgas.ohiodnr.gov/portals/oilgas/pdf/Wastewater-flowback.pdf.
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after they are pumped deep into the earth.22 This fluid contains thousands of
chemicals, some of which are known toxins and carcinogens.23 These chemicals
have contaminated drinking water supplies in multiple fracking areas,24 and there
is a growing body of evidence that links the contamination to fracking activity.25
ii. Air Contamination
Noxious fumes are the second category of negative externalities from
fracking sites. They come from fugitive vapors, onsite natural gas combustion,
onsite combustion of other fuels, and discharges of particulate matter from
associated operations.26 Common sources of emissions include “pad, road, and
pipeline construction; drilling, completion, and flowback activities that occur during
the development of a well; and gas processing and transmission equipment such
as controllers, compressors, dehydrators, pipelines, and storage vessels.”27 These
emissions release methane, volatile organic compounds, nitrogen oxides, sulphur
dioxide, particulate matter, n-hexane, benzene, toluene, ethybenzene, xylene, and
hydrogen sulphide,28 all of which are harmful to humans.29
Various fracking practices pose a health risk to humans because they release
compounds that cause smog, also known as ozone.30 Flowback is often left in openair pits to evaporate, which releases harmful volatile organic compounds into the
air.31 These volatile organic compounds react with sunlight and nitrogen oxides—
22. See Abrahm Lustgarten, New Study: Fluids from Marcellus Shale Likely Seeping into
PA Drinking Water, ProPublica (July 9, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/
new-study-fluids-from-marcellus-shale-likely-seeping-into-pa-drinking-water.
23. Colborn et al., supra note 14.
24. See, e.g., Amy Mall, Incidents Where Hydraulic Fracturing is a Suspected Cause of
Drinking Water Contamination, Nat. Res. Def. Council Staff Blog (Feb. 28, 2014), http://
switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/amall/incidents_where_hydraulic_frac.html.
25. See, e.g., Dominic C. DiGiulio, Richard T. Wilkin, Carlyle Miller & Gregory
Oberley, U.S. E.P.A., Draft: Investigation of Ground Water Pollution Near Pavillion, Wyoming, at xiii (Dec. 2011), http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/
EPA_ReportOnPavillion_Dec-8-2011.pdf (“[W]hen considered together with other lines
of evidence, the data indicates likely impact to groundwater can be explained by hydraulic
fracturing.”).
26. Richard K. Lattanzio, Cong. Research. Serv., R42833, Air Quality Issues in Natural
Gas Systems 5 (2013).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Colborn et al., supra note 14.
30. See Cong. Research. Serv., R42833 at 9; Mead Gruver, Wyoming’s Natural Gas Boom
Comes with Smog Attached, Associated Press (Mar. 9, 2011, 12:54 PM), http://www.nbcnews.
com/id/41971686#.Us2yDGRDseU.
31. See Wiseman, supra note 2, at 766; Dangers of Fracking, http://www.dangersoffracking.
com (April 22, 2015).
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which is also released by fracking—to produce ozone.32 Breathing ozone can cause
a variety of health problems and can have harmful effects on sensitive vegetation
and ecosystems.33 Fracking in rural areas has caused dangerous local levels of
ozone so high that they exceeded levels found in America’s most polluted cities.34
For example, fracking operations in Wyoming’s Upper Green River Basin caused
ozone spikes in January 2010 that exceeded the worst ozone levels found in Los
Angeles during the prior year.35 Additionally, a study found that thirty-nine percent
of residents in southern Pennsylvania who lived within one kilometer of fracking
operations developed upper-respiratory problems compared to eighteen percent of
residents who lived more than two kilometers away.36
iii. Land Contamination
Land contamination is the third main category of negative externalities
from fracking. Leakages on fracking sites have contaminated neighboring lands
with toxins,37 and examples of these events include breaches of flowback holding
ponds, spillage of chemicals during the fracking process, intentional dumping, and
toxic runoff.38 These contaminations have caused vegetation loss,39 fish kills,40 and
other property damage.41 The various adverse health effects associated with human
exposure to leaked fracking chemicals include upper respiratory irritation, burning
of the eyes, nausea, abdominal pain, rashes, nosebleeds, and headaches.42
II.

Hydraulic Fracturing Disproportionately Impacts the Rural Poor

The negative externalities from hydraulic fracturing disproportionately
burden members of lower socioeconomic classes. Fracking operations are
32. See Cong. Research. Serv., R42833 at 10; Ground Level Ozone, EPA, http://www.epa.
gov/groundlevelozone/ (last updated Dec. 23, 2014).
33. Ground Level Ozone, supra note 32.
34. See Gruver, supra note 30.
35. Id.
36. Peter M. Rabinowitz, Ilya B. Slizovskiy, Vanessa Lamers, Sally J. Trufan, Theodore R.
Holford, James D. Dziura, Peter N. Peduzzi, Michael J. Kane, John S. Reif, Theresa R. Weiss
& Meredith H. Stowe, Proximity to Natural Gas Wells and Reported Health Status: Results of a
Household Survey in Washington County, Pennsylvania, 123 Envtl. Health Persp. 21, 21 (2015).
37. See Wiseman, supra note 2, at 766−68.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 766−67.
40. Diana M. Papoulias & Anthony L. Velasco, Histopathological Analysis of Fish from
Acorn Fork Creek, Kentucky, Exposed to Hydraulic Fracturing Fluid Releases, 12 Southeastern Naturalist 92, 92 (2013).
41. See Wiseman, supra note 2, at 766−67.
42. Michelle Bamberger & Robert E. Oswald, Impacts of Gas Drilling on Human and Animal Health, 22 New Solutions 51, 61 (2012); Colborn et al., supra note 14, at 1045.
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predominantly performed in poor, rural areas, and the constituents of these
communities bear the brunt of fracking’s less-savory byproducts.43
Fracking operations are typically located in remote areas,44 and many
practical reasons explain this trend. It is advantageous to situate a well on rural
land because it is more spacious, less burdensome, and cheaper than fracking
in suburban or urban areas. Rural areas provide the significant amount of space
needed for fracking operations, which can require access by hundreds of tractortrailers. Intrinsically, there is more land per person in rural areas, and drilling rigs—
along with the associated visual, auditory, and olfactory nuisances—can be situated
farther from residences and other sensitive locations. This is simply not the case in
suburban and urban areas, which have higher population densities and higher land
values for the footprints of drilling sites. Accordingly, positioning wells in these
more-populated areas would raise the cost of fracking operations.
An analysis of the primary hotbeds of fracking in the United States—the
Marcellus formation beneath much of Appalachia, the Bakken formation under
North Dakota, the Woodford formation underlying Oklahoma, and the Eagle Ford
formation in Texas—highlight the relationship between fracking and the rural poor.
Data from the U.S. Census45 and state regulatory agencies evidence that many
rural fracking areas lack the wealth of suburban and urban areas, especially prior
to the fracking boom. For example, the counties with the most fracking activity in
Kentucky, Virginia, Pennsylvania, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Texas were some
of the most impoverished counties in these states prior to fracking.46
The monetary incentive to lease land for fracking is higher for the poor in these
rural areas, as their marginal utility for the signing payments and potential royalties
is higher than the marginal utility of the wealthy for the same amount of money.
Economic theory suggests that this incentive leads to fracking activity occurring
more frequently on land owned by poorer members of these communities.47 While
some studies have found that economic conditions improve in areas where fracking
is introduced,48 these studies fail to negate the fact that the negative externalities
43. See N.Y. Dep’t of Health, supra note 2, at 117 (“The health burdens of unconventional
gas are likely to fall disproportionately on rural communities, the young and the elderly.”).
44. 136 Cong. Rec. 35,010 (1990) (statement of Rep. Fields).
45. Data from the 2003 Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates is used as a benchmark
for the conditions before the majority of fracking operations began. U.S. Census Bureau,
Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates: State and County Estimates for 2003 [hereinafter 2003 Census], available at http://www.census.gov/did/www/saipe/data/statecounty/
data/2003.html.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 49−56.
47. See Russell Gold, The Fracking Fight’s New Front Line: Cities States Begin to Limit
Oil-and-Gas Drilling to Protect Residents, Scenic Areas, Wall St. J. (June 4, 2014, 2:14
PM), www.wsj.com/articles/fracking-meets-new-resistance-from-communities-1401905185.
48. E.g., Diana Furchtgott-Roth, Can Fracking Save the U.S. Economy?, Market Watch
(Oct. 4, 2013, 6:16 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/can-fracking-save-the-useconomy-2013-10-04.
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from fracking are centralized in these regions and that they often burden those who
do not receive economic benefits from fracking.
The localization of fracking operations in poor, rural areas is exemplified
in Marcellus shale states. Virginia’s three main fracking counties—Buchanan,
Wise, and Dickenson—are all in the state’s top ten most impoverished counties.49
In Pennsylvania, only one of the seven counties with the most fracking wells has a
poverty level above the state average, and only marginally so.50 Of Kentucky’s 120
counties, the sixteen with the most natural gas wells all fall within the state’s thirtyone most impoverished counties.51
This trend is also seen in the Midwest, where the Bakken shale formation
underlies North Dakota. The state’s top four natural gas-producing counties—
McKenzie, Montrail, Dunn, and Williams—rank forty-eighth, forty-seventh,
thirty-ninth, and thirty third for worst poverty rates in the state, respectively.52 In
Oklahoma’s Woodford formation, only one of the top five natural gas-producing
counties has a poverty level above the state average; the others constitute some of
the poorest in the state.53 Even in Texas, with its unusual overlap of America’s third
largest landlocked shale reserve54 and the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolis, the top
four counties for natural gas production all fall in rural areas.55 Moreover, three of
these counties are in the poorest six percent of Texas’s 254 counties.56
49. Buchanan, Wise, and Dickenson had the ninety-fifth, ninety-first, and eighty-seventh
worst poverty rates out of the ninety-five Virginian counties, respectively. Compare 2003
Census, supra note 45, with Va. Dep’t of Mines, Minerals, & Energy, GIS Map of Virginian
Gas Wells, http://dmme.virginia.gov/webmaps/DGO/.
50. The 9.7% poverty rate in Washington County, which ranked twenty-sixth out of sixty-seven
Pennsylvanian counties, barely beat the state average of 10.6%. Compare 2003 Census, supra note
45, with FracTracker, PA Unconventional Drilled Wells, http://www.fractracker.org/downloads/.
51. Compare 2003 Census, supra note 45, with Ky. Div. of Oil and Gas, 2010 Gas Production Report (2010), http://oilandgas.ky.gov/Pages/ProductionReports.aspx.
52. Compare 2003 Census, supra note 45, with N.D. Dep’t Mineral Resources, October
2013 Oil and Gas Prod. Report (2013), https://www.dmr.nd.gov/oilgas/mprindex.asp.
53. Roger Mills County had a poverty rate lower than the average in Oklahoma, whereas
Latimer, Caddo, Coal, and Pittsburg counties ranked sixty-fifth, sixty-fourth, sixty-second,
and forty-seventh worst, respectively, out of the seventy-seven counties in Oklahoma.
Compare 2003 Census, supra note 45, with Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 2011 Report on Oil and
Natural Gas Activity Within the State of Oklahoma (2011), http://www.occeweb.com/
og/2011%20Annual%20Report.pdf.
54. The Barnett shale formation is America’s third largest shale gas reserve. U.S. Energy
Info. Admin., Review of Emerging Resources: U.S. Shale Gas and Oil Plays 5 (2011),
http://205.254.135.7/analysis/studies/usshalegas/pdf/usshaleplays.pdf.
55. Hidalgo County, Zapata County, Webb County, and Panola County. Tex. R.R. Comm’n,
Oil & Gas Production Data Query Jan. 1993 to Jan 2013, http://webapps.rrc.state.tx.us/
PDQ/home.do (follow “General Production Query” hyperlink; then select “Lease,” “Jan
1993” to “Jan 2013,” “Gas Wells,” “Statewide”; and “Submit”) (last updated Jan. 17, 2015).
56. Hidalgo County, Zapata County, and Webb County. Id. (follow “General Production Query”
hyperlink; then select “Lease,” “Jan 1993” to “Jan 2013,” “Gas Wells,” “Statewide”; and “Submit”).
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The ills of natural gas operations are fractious: they are not confined to the
land of a lessor. There are multiple incidences of air, water, and land contamination
affecting neighboring residents.57 While these non-lessors are exposed to the potential
harms attendant to fracking, they are not entitled to the benefits granted to a lessor.
A fracking operation involves quintessential negative externalities, as it is “a market
production or consumption activity that reduces the wellbeing of persons, other than
the producer or consumer, and those persons are not compensated for the reduction.”58
The dynamics of compensation in fracking leases cause additional inequities.
Fracking lessors are compensated for the contracted degradation of their land, and
this benefit puts the leaseholders in a better position to move away from fracking’s
residual harms once the extraction is completed. In contrast, the surrounding
community members who only receive the detriments of fracking are in a worse
position to relocate. They miss out on the contractual benefits, and their potentially
contaminated land is worth less than before the fracking operations began.59 This is
especially taxing on the many affected rural residents who are “land rich and cash
poor” because fracking degrades and devalues their primary financial asset, their land.
III.

The Common Law and Federal Statutes Fail to Provide Justice
Aggrieved Parties from Lower Socioeconomic Classes

to

The common law and current federal statutes do not afford aggrieved
parties sufficient access to justice.60 The doctrines of trespass, nuisance, negligence,
and strict liability give affected individuals an inadequate avenue to compensation
through the state courts.61 The sundry federal laws that ostensibly regulate fracking
similarly lack remedies for aggrieved parties in federal court.
A. The Failure of Common Law Remedies
While individuals harmed by fracking’s negative externalities can bring
common law tort claims against fracking companies,62 the litigation to date shows
57. See, e.g., N.Y. Dep’t of Health, supra note 2; Amy Mall, supra note 24.
58. Tim Edgar, Building a Better GAAR, 27 Va. Tax Rev. 833, 853 (2008) (citing Jonathan
Gruber, Public Finance & Public Policy 118 (2005)).
59. See BBC Research and Consulting, supra note 13.
60. See Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas
Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 115, 146 (2009).
61. See Jason T. Gerken, What the Frack Shale We Do? A Proposed Environmental Regulatory Scheme for Hydraulic Fracturing, 41 Cap. U.L. Rev. 81, 97 (2013) (“[T]he search for
a truly adequate regulatory framework is substantively important because the common law
effectively shields polluters from meaningful regulation.”).
62. See, e.g., Tucker v. Sw. Energy Co., No. 1:11-cv-45-DPM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20697, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 17, 2012); Ginardi v. Frontier Gas Servs. LLC, No. 4:11-cv00420-BRW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89054, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 10, 2011).
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that the vast majority of these cases fail.63 Causation is frequently the Achilles heel
in tort actions involving fracking.64 This and other impediments to the fruitful use
of trespass, nuisance, negligence, and strict liability are analyzed in turn.
i. Trespass
Trespass is implicated by all three of fracking’s primary categories of
negative externalities, yet success via this doctrine remains elusive. Trespass is the
intentional, unlawful entry upon the land of another.65 To be guilty of trespassing,
one must intend the act that caused the trespass rather than intend to trespass. The
few fracking cases in which courts found trespasses typically involved continuing,
physical invasions by drilling across property lines.66
Trespass claims have been largely unsuccessful in above-ground contexts
as well. Plaintiffs have had little luck proving that air pollution from fracking that
travels onto their land constitutes a trespass.67 Traditionally, air pollution could not
constitute a trespass; however, some states now allow the cause of action if injury
can be shown.68 Plaintiffs who own surface rights above mineral interests also have
an uphill battle to show that an operator’s use of the surface estate is a trespass. This
difficulty stems from an operator’s right to perform activities fairly incident to the
extraction of natural gas.69
Alternative claims of underground trespasses are also futile. Due to the rule
of capture,70 courts have held that fracking operators are not liable in trespass for the
removal of natural gas under the property of another.71 The Texas Supreme Court
ruled that the subterranean movement of fracking fluid from a state-authorized well
onto neighboring parcels is not a trespass.72 Moreover, it would be exceedingly
63. Christopher S. Kulander, Common Law Aspects of Shale Oil and Gas Development, 49
Idaho L. Rev. 367, 374 (2013).
64. See Wiseman, supra note 61, at 156.
65. See Kulander, supra note 63, at 374 (“Trespass by the operator generally encompasses
intentional and unlawful intrusion upon real property owned by another.”).
66. See, e.g., R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560, 567 n.2 (Tex. 1962).
67. E.g., Tucker, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20697, at *3.
68. Larry D. Scheafer, Annotation, Recovery in Trespass for Injury to Land Caused by Air
Pollutants, 2 A.L.R. 4th 1054, 1054 (2008). See also Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So.
2d 523 (Ala. 1979); Miller v. Carnation Co., 516 P.2d 661 (Colo. App. 1973).
69. See, e.g., Teel v. Chesapeake Appalachia LLC, 906 F. Supp. 2d 519, 523 (N.D. W. Va.
2012).
70. “A fundamental principle of oil-and-gas law holding that there is no liability for drainage of oil and gas from under the lands of another so long as there has been no trespass and
all relevant statutes and regulations have been observed.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1531
(10th ed. 2014).
71. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. 2008).
72. R.R. Comm’n v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1962).
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difficult to prove this claim in other states.73 Fracking fluid is injected thousands
of feet into the earth, where it can spend years before seeping into a well and
providing a cause of action for trespass.74 This leaves a plaintiff with the Sisyphean
task of proving that—thousands of feet underground—a particular chemical from
a particular operator leaked into her well and that no intervening or superseding
causes existed.75
ii. Nuisance
Nuisance suits are “insufficient to adequately address the effects of fracing
[sic]”76 as they usually warrant only small damages and many cases are difficult
to prove outside of the suburban and urban contexts.77 A private nuisance is a
substantial and unreasonable interference with a surface owner’s use and enjoyment
of land,78 and an injury to persons or property must be shown.79 Plaintiffs may
make claims for disturbances from fracking operations, which include noises from
compressor stations, light pollution from nighttime activities, and interference
with viewsheds.80 However, these claims will not provide damages for the major
externalities of fracking: health problems and diminution of property value due
to contamination.81 Landowners experiencing problems related to underground
activity may file claims for nuisances such as decreased water pressure or dried
up wells, but they will encounter the same causation problems that ail trespass
claimants.82 Even if a claimant can prove nuisance, states courts like those in New
York can simply refuse to provide injunctions when the damage to the defendant
and the economic consequences of an injunction are larger than the damage to the
73. See, e.g., Tucker v. Sw. Energy Co., No. 1:11-cv-45-DPM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20697, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 17, 2012); Gerken, supra note 61, at 97−98.
74. Wiseman, supra note 60, at 156.
75. Id. at 185; see also Jeffrey C. King, Jamie Lavergne Bryan & Meredith Clark, Factual
Causation: The Missing Link in Hydraulic Fracture-Groundwater Contamination Litigation,
22 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 341, 350 (2012).
76. Wiseman, supra note 60, at 156.
77. See Timothy Riley, Wrangling with Urban Wildcatters: Defending Texas Municipal Oil
and Gas Development Ordinances Against Regulatory Takings Challenges, 32 Vt. L. Rev.
349, 354–55 (2007); Wiseman, supra note 60, at 156.
78. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 822 (1979); Black’s Law Dictionary 1235 (10th ed.
2014).
79. Frank P. Grad, Treatise on Environmental Law § 2.02, at 2-37 (2014).
80. See Carl J. Pernicone, Michael J. Naughton & Samuel I. Reich, Preliminary Insight:
Legal Implication of Hydrofracking in the Marcellus Shale, 2012 In-House Def. Q. 38, 40,
http://www.wilsonelser.com/files/repository/hydrofracking-in-the-marcellus-shale.pdf.
81. See Wiseman, supra note 60, at 156.
82. Id.
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plaintiff.83 These states break rank with the traditional notion that the law does not
tolerate any interference with the reasonable enjoyment of someone’s property,84
and instead they favor moneyed interests over the interests of those who are harmed.
iii. Negligence
The doctrine of negligence is ill-suited to fulfill the needs of injured parties.
It is beleaguered by causation problems and also requires a plaintiff to show that the
operator was not engaging in “reasonable and prudent” behavior.85 “‘[R]easonable
and prudent’ is a generous standard for operators in that courts rarely find a
particular activity of a mineral owner or its lessee to be unreasonable.”86 Generally,
an action is “reasonable and prudent” if it is what a normal operator would have
done given the circumstances, which generally defaults to the industry standard.87
Notwithstanding these legal obstacles, negligence cases have prevailed in limited
circumstances, such as property damage from an operator’s use of antiquated or
malfunctioning equipment, the overflow of a disposal pit full of saltwater and used
fracking fluid, the nonfulfillment of notification requirements, and the failure to
complete a well in a way that prevents the escape of gas.88
A plaintiff’s difficulty in bringing a negligence claim varies by state. Some
courts have instituted modified case management orders that require plaintiffs to
make a prima facie case of exposure, injury, and causation before allowing full
discovery.89 This added burden on plaintiffs can involve “submitting expert opinions
regarding the nature of the substances to which the plaintiffs were allegedly exposed;
allowing access to the plaintiffs’ medical records; and providing other supporting
data.”90 These orders unnecessarily raise an already high hurdle. Plaintiffs can also
bring a negligence per se claim for the violation of federal or state regulations,
but the federal regulatory scheme is weak and state regulations vary, which leaves
many plaintiffs without an avenue to compensation.91
83. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 872 (N.Y. 1970); Grad, supra
note 79, at 2-45.
84. See Grad, supra note 79, at 2-37, 2-45 to 2-46.
85. Kulander, supra note 63, at 375.
86. Id. (quoting Michael J. Mazzone, Changing Times Bring Conflict with Surface Owners,
Am. Oil & Gas Rep. (Sept. 23, 2012), http://www.aogr.com/index.php/web-features/exclusive-story/changing-times-bring-conflict-with-surface-owners).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. These modified orders “are commonly referred to as ‘Lone Pine’ orders.” Adam Vann,
Brandon J. Murrill & Mary Tiemann, Cong. Research. Serv., R43152, Hydraulic Fracturing: Selected Legal Issues 30 & n.250 (2014).
90. Id. at 30.
91. Rachael Rawlins, Planning for Fracking on the Barnett Shale: Soil and Water Contamination Concerns, and the Role of Local Government, 44 Envtl. L. 135, 164 (2014).
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iv. Strict Liability
The doctrine of strict liability does not help in fracking cases. While imposing
strict liability would significantly ease plaintiffs’ burden of proof, no court has held
that fracking is an “abnormally dangerous” activity to which the doctrine applies.
If future cases change this, fracking operators would become subject to liability for
harming another via fracking operations, even though the operator exercised the
utmost care to prevent the harm.92 However, cases to date have only held that strict
liability is inapplicable to hydraulic fracturing.93
National legislation that incorporates a burden-shifting approach would
be more useful than state-by-state designations of fracking as an “abnormally
dangerous” activity. As common law designation is governed by individual states,
they are free to eschew strict liability,94 and its application to fracking can only
advance one state at a time. This incremental, optional application would create
a patchwork of applicability across the country, require a significant amount of
time, and leave plaintiffs high and dry in the interim. The ensuing fragmentation
would likely include a common law variant of the race to the bottom seen in
other regulatory frameworks, which would aid neither plaintiffs’ trials nor their
tribulations. Federal legislation is preferable because it could simultaneously apply
uniform standards to all states.
B. Exemptions in Federal Regulation Leave Plaintiffs Without Access
to Justice
While some federal laws apply to hydraulic fracturing, most contain large
exceptions and only apply to narrow parts of the operation. This hodgepodge of
legal oversight leaves much of the fracking process unregulated and does not
provide the needed legal framework to help the rural poor redress fracking’s
negative externalities. The major federal laws that apply, if only partially, to the
three main categories of negative externalities from fracking—water, air, and land
contamination—are analyzed in turn.
i. The Safe Water Drinking Act
The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)95 does not ensure safe drinking water to
individuals near fracking operations. First, the SWDA generally exempts fracking from
its regulation,96 which otherwise requires the EPA to protect underground sources of
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
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E.g., Williams v. Amoco Prod. Co., 734 P.2d 1113, 1123 (Kan. 1987).
See id.
42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–j (2012).
Id. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii).
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drinking water by regulating the injection of fluids into the earth.97 In 2005, Congress
passed the Energy Policy Act, part of which amended the SDWA and clarified that the
Underground Injection Control requirements in the SDWA did not apply to fracking
unless diesel fuel was used in the fracking fluid.98 Second, the underground injection
of natural gas for storage purposes is also exempted from the SDWA’s permitting
requirements.99 Third, the scope of the statute “addresses the quality of water provided
by public water systems and does not address private, residential wells.”100
While the SWDA generally does not apply to fracking operations, some
activities related to the fracking process fall under its purview. The exclusions above
do not apply to the underground injection of flowback or enhanced gas recovery
operations, both of which require SDWA permits.101
ii. The Clean Water Act
The Clean Water Act (CWA)102 does not provide sufficient protection to
injured plaintiffs, as it can only aid them in limited circumstances. No court has
held that discharges to underground aquifers are subject to CWA permits, and no
regulatory agency has designated them as such. Additionally, neither the injection
of flowback into underground wells103 nor the stormwater runoff from oil and gas
operations104 is regulated by the Act. However, the CWA does require parties that
97. Id. § 300h (describing the EPA’s authority to oversee local regulatory efforts).
98. Id. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii) (“The term ‘underground injection’ . . . excludes . . . the underground injection of fluids or propping agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic
fracturing operations related to oil, gas, or geothermal production activities.”); Cong. Research. Serv., R43152 at 1−3 (describing the 2005 amendment to the SDWA).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(A)–(B) (“The term ‘underground injection’ means the subsurface emplacement of fluids by well injection; and excludes the underground injection of
natural gas for purposes of storage. . .” (internal references omitted)).
100. Adam Vann, Brandon J. Murrill & Mary Tiemann, Cong. Research. Serv., R43152,
Hydraulic Fracturing: Selected Legal Issues 2 (2014).
101. Id. at 2−3.
102. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251−1387 (2012).
103. Hydraulic Fracturing Background Information, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (May 9,
2012), http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/wells_hydrowhat.
cfm (“Underground injection of flowback is regulated by either EPA Underground Injection
Control (UIC) program or a state with primary UIC enforcement authority.”).
104. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(2) (“The Administrator shall not require a permit under this section . . . for discharges of stormwater runoff from mining operations or oil and gas exploration,
production, processing, or treatment operations or transmission facilities, composed entirely
of flows which are from conveyances or systems of conveyances (including but not limited to
pipes, conduits, ditches, and channels) used for collecting and conveying precipitation runoff
and which are not contaminated by contact with, or do not come into contact with, any overburden, raw material, intermediate products, finished product, byproduct, or waste products located
on the site of such operations.”). The definition of “oil and gas exploration and production”
explains that construction of these oil and gas sites is also exempt. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(24).
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seek to discharge flowback or other pollutants into Publicly Owned Treatment Works
(POTW)105 or navigable surface waters to apply for a permit under Section 402.106
Discharges of flowback into navigable waters require a National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System permit from the EPA.107 These discharges are
subject to both technology-based and water quality-based effluent limitations.108
However, the CWA’s restrictions do not provide protection for all plaintiffs, as the
restrictions do not cover the pollution of certain water bodies. The CWA does not
cover pollution of a plaintiff’s intra-state lakes, impermanent streams, or isolated
wetlands,109 and it is unclear whether someone dumping pollutants by hand into
any water body owned by a plaintiff would fall within the ambits of the CWA’s
jurisdiction.110 A plaintiff is only able to recover damages for discharges from
a point source into traditionally navigable waters, interstate waters, wetlands
adjacent to traditionally navigable waters, or waters that have a “significant
nexus” to traditionally navigable or interstate waters, such as their tributaries or
wetlands adjacent thereto.111

105. Discharges to POTWs cannot include any chemical that “interferes with, passes through,
or otherwise is incompatible with such works.” 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(1). This does not provide
much help to plaintiffs, as the majority of complaints are from discharges that are not sent to
POTWs. The EPA is also creating additional pretreatment standards for oil and gas companies under its Effluent Guideline Program. EPA Announces Schedule to Develop Natural Gas
Wastewater Standards/Announcement is Part of Administration’s Priority to Ensure Natural Gas
Development Continues Safely and Responsibly, EPA (Oct. 20, 2011), http://yosemite.epa.gov/
opa/admpress.nsf/d0cf6618525a9efb85257359003fb69d/.
106. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
107. See id. § 1311; 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(a) (2014).
108. The technology-based requirements for direct discharges from oil and gas extraction
facilities into surface waters are found in 40 C.F.R. § 435 (2013).
109. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (plurality opinion) (interpreting the
scope of the term “waters of the United States” as stated in the CFR provisions governing the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ enforcement of the CWA); 40 C.F.R. § 203.2(a)(1) (2014)
(stating that the EPA’s application of the CWA may be specified through sections of the CFR
that apply to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers); id. § 230.3(s) (defining the term “waters of
the United States” as it applies to the EPA when enforcing the CWA).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 650 (2d Cir. 1993)
(holding that the defendant did not violate the Clean Water Act by dumping pollutants into a
river by hand because a human was not considered a point source under the Act).
111. EPA & U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Following the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Decision in Rapanos v. United States & Carabell v. United States (2007),
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/RapanosGuidance6507.pdf. The EPA is in the process of writing a regulation that could alter its jurisdiction slightly. See Definition of “Waters
of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 22,188 (proposed Apr. 21,
2014) (amending the Clean Water Act).
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iii. The Clean Air Act
The Clean Air Act (CAA)112 does not guarantee clean air to those near
fracking operations. While recent EPA regulations help to limit the amount of some
fracking emissions, many pollutants leak through unregulated.
In 2012, the EPA updated the CAA’s New Source Performance Standards
(NSPS) to cover volatile organic compound emissions from fracking.113 Many
hydraulic fracturing sites must employ “green completions” or “reduced emissions
completions” after January 1, 2015.114 Green completions recapture, clean, and
reuse natural gas that would have otherwise been vented into the atmosphere.115
Both new and existing wells are subject to the regulations,116 which are expected to
reduce volatile organic compound emissions by ninety-five percent117 and to reduce
methane emission substantially.118
Most, but not all, wells are subject to these requirements. Natural gas
exploratory wells, delineation wells, and low-pressure wells are not required to
use green combustion devices.119 These exempted natural gas operations comprise
approximately twelve percent of the hydraulically-fractured gas wells,120 and
most of them are required to use combustion completion devices.121 Combustion
112. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2012).
113. Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 Fed. Reg. 49,490 (Aug. 16, 2012).
114. Id. at 49,492.
115. See Richard K. Lattanzio, Cong. Research. Serv., R42833, Air Quality Issues in
Natural Gas Systems 17 (2013).
116. Oil and Natural Gas Sector, 77 Fed. Reg. at 49,493.
117. EPA, Overview of Final Amendments to Air Regulations for the Oil and Natural
Gas Industry 1 (2012), http://epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/pdfs/20120417fs.pdf.
118. Id. at 3.
119. Oil and Natural Gas Sector, 77 Fed. Reg. at 49,517. See also Cong. Research. Serv.,
R42833 at 17 n.47 (“Exploratory well is defined as a well outside known fields or the first
well drilled in an oil or gas field where no other oil and gas production exists; delineation well
is defined as a well drilled in order to determine the boundary of a field or producing reservoir; and low pressure well is defined as a well with reservoir pressure and vertical well depth
such that 0.445 times the reservoir pressure (in psia) minus 0.038 times the vertical well depth
(in feet) minus 67.578 psia is less than the flow line pressure at the sales meter.”).
120. EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis: Final New Source Performance Standards and
Amendments to the National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for the
Oil and Natural Gas Industry 3-16 & tbl.3-3 (2012), http://www.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/
RIAs/oil_natural_gas_ final_neshap_nsps_ria.pdf.
121. Oil and Natural Gas Sector, 77 Fed. Reg. at 49,499. A complete combustion device
employs a technique called flaring, which “burns off the gas that would otherwise escape during the well completion process.” Adam Vann, Brandon J. Murrill & Mary Tiemann, Cong.
Research. Serv., R43152, Hydraulic Fracturing: Selected Legal Issues 9 n.46 (2014).
These wells need not use combustion completion devices when it is hazardous or prohibited
by state or local laws or regulations. Oil and Natural Gas Sector, 77 Fed. Reg. at 49,499.
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completions are only an incomplete solution, as combusting natural gas releases
multiple air pollutants, including carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen
oxides, sulfur dioxide, and particulate matter.122
The 2012 EPA air standards fail to regulate many harmful emissions from
fracking. Emissions of methane, nitrogen oxides, particulate matter, and hydrogen
sulfide are not covered by these standards.123 The 2012 standards do not cover volatile
organic compound emissions from new or modified compressors at natural gas well
sites,124 and they do not cover volatile organic compounds or SO2 emissions from
existing sources unless they are otherwise regulated under the Hazardous Air Pollutant
criteria.125 Furthermore, the EPA’s 2012 standards do not cover: emissions from coalbed methane production facilities; all field engines, drilling rig engines, and turbines;
well-head and transmission and storage segment compressors; well-head activities; all
pneumatic devices other than controllers; and storage vessels, such as skid-mounted
vessels, mobile vessels, well cellars, sumps, and produced water ponds.126
Many sources of emissions are legislatively exempted from regulated CAA
categories. Well completions, pneumatic controllers, compressors, and storage
vessels are all exempted by the 2012 standards from being classified as “major
sources” under the Title V permitting program of the CAA.127 Section 112(n)(4)
of the CAA further exempts “any oil or gas exploration or production well (with
its associated equipment)” from “major source” aggregation under the National
Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants.128 The same section also exempts
“oil and gas production wells (with [their] associated equipment)” from being listed
as an “area source.”129 While a variance to this area source exemption exists, it does
not apply to rural areas.130 These exemptions prevent the regulation of much of
fracking’s air pollution.
iv. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)131 provides
inadequate regulation of fracking’s negative externalities. Normally, Subtitle
C of RCRA provides “cradle-to-the-grave” oversight of hazardous wastes.132
122. Cong. Research. Serv., R42833 at 6.
123. Id. at 25. Methane is a greenhouse gas and a precursor to ozone, which is a criteria
pollutant under the CAA along with nitrogen oxides and particulate matter. Id. at 9.
124. Id. at 50 & tbl.A-1.
125. Id. at 25.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 26.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(4)(A) (2012).
129. Id. § 7412(n)(4)(B).
130. Id.
131. Id. §§ 6901–6992k.
132. Id. §§ 6921–6939e.
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Unused fracking fluids and acids are not categorically exempted,133 and they
may be subject to Subtitle C regulation if they have hazardous characteristics.134
However, produced water and drilling fluids are exempted from regulation.135
These fluids contain hazardous constituents such as heavy metals,136 yet they are
exempt “[r]egardless of whether those fluids exhibit the regulatory characteristics
of hazardous waste.”137
v. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act
Fracking’s coverage under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)138 is anything but comprehensive.
While CERCLA generally applies strict liability to those who release or cause
a threat of release of any “hazardous substance” into the environment, releases
of petroleum and natural gas are excluded from the definition of a “hazardous
substance.”139 This substance exclusion does not exempt a fracking facility as
a whole.140 Therefore, CERCLA can apply to fracking sites if other “hazardous
substances” are released into the environment—either above or below ground—
and they endanger the public health, the public welfare, or the environment.141
For instance, CERCLA applies to the release of fracking fluid, flowback, or
other substances involved in fracking operations if they satisfy the definition of a
hazardous substance.142
133. EPA, Exemption of Oil and Gas Exploration and Production Wastes From Federal
Hazardous Waste Regulations 10–11 (2002), http://www.epa.gov/osw/nonhaz/industrial/
special/oil/oil-gas.pdf.
134. A waste may be deemed hazardous based on the characteristics of reactivity, ignitability, corrosivity, or toxicity, which are explained at 40 C.F.R. § 261.20–24 (2014).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(2)(A) (“[D]rilling fluids, produced waters, and other wastes
associated with the exploration, development, or production of crude oil or natural gas or
geothermal energy shall be subject only to existing State or Federal regulatory programs in
lieu of [Subtitle C].”).
136. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, supra note 4, at 66−71.
137. Adam Vann, Brandon J. Murrill & Mary Tiemann, Cong. Research. Serv., R43152,
Hydraulic Fracturing: Selected Legal Issues 11 (2014).
138. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675.
139. CERCLA’s definition of a “hazardous substance” explains that it “does not include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed
or designated as a hazardous substance . . . and the term does not include natural gas, natural
gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel . . . .” Id. § 9601(14).
140. Cong. Research. Serv., R43152 at 13.
141. See Reportable Quantities: What Substances are Covered?, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/
osweroe1/content/reporting/faq_subs.htm (Apr. 22, 2015).
142. Cong. Research. Serv., R43152 at 13. The definition of a hazardous substance can be
found at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
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An additional CERCLA clause immunizes fracking operations from liability
resulting from a “federally permitted release.”143 This includes releases permitted
pursuant to the CAA, the CWA, the RCRA, or the SDWA.144 This exemption also
applies to:
[A]ny injection of fluids or other materials authorized under applicable
State law (i) for the purpose of stimulating or treating wells for the
production of crude oil, natural gas, or water, (ii) for the purpose of
secondary, tertiary, or other enhanced recovery of crude oil or natural
gas, or (iii) which are brought to the surface in conjunction with the
production of crude oil or natural gas and which are reinjected . . . .145
Accordingly, the only way a fracking operation could be subject to CERCLA is if it
released a non-petroleum hazardous substance without federal or state authorization.
vi. Other Federal Legislation
Multiple other federal laws contain exclusions for fracking. The National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)146 requires a governmental assessment of the effects
of major federal actions affecting the quality of the human environment.147 However,
NEPA contains a rebuttable presumption that many activities undertaken “for the
purpose of exploration or development of oil or gas” are exempt from traditional
requirements.148 Oil and gas extraction are also immune to the reporting requirements
of the Toxic Release Inventory under the Emergency Planning and Community Right
to Know Act.149 Lastly, it is currently unclear how the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA)150 applies to fracking, given the multiple existing exemptions and EPA’s
pending rulemaking regarding Sections 8(a) and (d) of the Act.151
143. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(j).
144. Id. § 9601(10).
145. Id.
146. Id. §§ 4321–4370.
147. Id. § 4332(C).
148. Id. § 15942(a).
149. Id. §§ 11001–11050. The Toxic Release Inventory imposes reporting requirements on
facilities that fall under certain Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, but not for oil
and gas operations, which are in SIC code 13. See id. § 11023(b)(1)(A).
150. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2697 (2012).
151. Act of Oct. 11, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 852 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2607(a),
(d)). For updated information on the rulemaking, see Natural Gas Extraction–Hydraulic Fracturing, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/hydraulicfracturing (last updated Mar. 23, 2015). For an analysis
of the possible outcomes of the rulemaking, see Arnold & Porter LLP, Advisory: Additional
Fracking Chemical Substance Reporting Requirements Under TSCA May Further Complicate
Landscape (2012), http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/Advisory%20Additional_
Fracking_Chemical_Substance_Reporting_Requirements_Under_TSCA_May_Further_Complicate_Landscape.pdf.

298

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality		

IV.

		

Volume 3, Issue 2

Federal, Not State, Statutory Regulation Is Needed

For those who are afflicted with the negative externalities of fracking,
statutory protections are preferable to reliance on the common law alone. While
common law tort litigation can provide remedies after the fact, legislation helps
to prevent problems before they occur.152 Statutes can provide causes of action to
aid injured parties who seek relief and potentially integrate equitable burdens of
proof and liability schemes.153 These statutes can employ additional techniques—
such as monitoring, whistleblower protections, criminal liability, and standing
for environmental groups—that potentiate the internalization of social and
environmental costs.
A. State Regulation is Inadequate
New or amended federal legislation is needed, as the existing state regulation
and oversight is insufficient. Currently state and local governments “are responsible
for virtually all of the day-to-day regulation and oversight of natural gas systems,”154
which varies widely between states.155 Each state typically has one or more agencies
that regulate various aspects of well permitting and environmental compliance,156
and state laws can address multiple aspects of environmental issues associated with
fracking.157 While some argue that regulation should be left to the states,158 this is
inadequate, as it involves multiple shortcomings not present in federal regulation.
State regulation of fracking sets the regulatory stage for an undesirable,
legislative race to the bottom.159 This is a situation in which states adopt increasingly
lax regulations in an effort to entice industry to the area.160 Evidence of this can
152. See Charles D. Kolstad, Thomas S. Ulen & Gary V. Johnson, Ex Post Liability for
Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?, 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 888,
888 (1990).
153. See id.
154. Richard K. Lattanzio, Cong. Research. Serv., R42833, Air Quality Issues in Natural Gas Systems 46 (2013).
155. Id. at 2.
156. Id. (“In general, each state has one or more regulatory agencies that may permit wells,
including their design, location, spacing, operation, and abandonment, and may regulate for
environmental compliance.”).
157. Id. (“With respect to pollution controls, state laws may address many aspects of water
management and disposal, air emissions, underground injection, wildlife impacts, surface
disturbance, and worker health and safety.”).
158. E.g., Jeff Bell, Chamber of Commerce to Obama: Hands Off Fracking, Columbus
Bus. First (Oct. 8, 2013, 12:34 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/columbus/blog/2013/10/
chambers-of-commerce-ask-obama-team-to.html.
159. Gerken, supra note 61, at 128–29.
160. See id. at 129; Wiseman, supra note 2.
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be seen in recent fracking regulation.161 A race to the bottom is undesirable to
parties negatively affected by fracking, as it is well within the prerogative of state
legislatures to enact minimal pollution regulations or deny standing to plaintiffs.
Federal legislation is better suited to regulate pollution from fracking.
First, water and air pollution from fracking migrates freely across state lines, and
states are not in a position to regulate such interstate pollution.162 Second, state
oversight in many states simply cannot keep pace with the fracking boom due to
budgetary constraints.163 The increase in drilling drastically outpaces the increase
in enforcement personnel.164 Third, federal standards can assist the industry by
providing uniformity. Federal, not state, legislation can provide this benefit.
B. Federal Regulation Is Needed and Should Incorporate Existing
Regulatory Schemes
Comprehensive federal legislation is needed to provide citizens their fair
day in court. Such legislation would help internalize the negative externalities
associated with fracking by setting a uniform regulatory floor that could be
implemented simultaneously throughout the states.165 This is nothing new, as
federal agencies such as the EPA have long exercised jurisdiction over activities that
produce pollution and have the potential to cause environmental harm, including
some aspects of fracking.166 The authors of new legislation should draw from the
well of similar state and federal regulations to create a regulatory floor that provides
wronged parties with a legal path to compensation.
161. See Gerken, supra note 61, at 129 & n.366 (“Indeed, some states appear to have
avoided certain regulation expressly to attract industry—with Pennsylvania, for example, initially opposing a severance tax on gas and citing concerns about its effects on the rate of well
development.” (citing Wiseman, supra note 2)).
162. Gianna Cricco-Lizza, Hydraulic Fracturing and Cooperative Federalism: Injecting
Reality into Policy Formation, 42 Seton Hall L. Rev. 703, 730 (2012).
163. Hannah Wiseman, Fracturing Regulation Applied, 22 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 361,
371–77 (2012) (“Some state agencies tasked with executing environmental regulations—often in addition to ensuring oil and gas conservation and protecting mineral rights—have been
overwhelmed by the pace and volume of new well development.”).
164. Gerken, supra note 61, at 116–17.
165. “[T]he Federal Government has an important role to play by . . . setting sensible, costeffective public health and environmental standards to implement Federal law and augment
State safeguards.” Exec. Order No. 13,605, 77 Fed. Reg. 23,107 (Apr. 13, 2012).
166. The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2013), Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251–1387 (2013), Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k
(2013), Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300k (2013), and Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2013),
are all examples of federal regulation of pollution.
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i. Federal Legislation Should Incorporate Proven State
Regulatory Schemes
States have developed various legal tools to manage fracking operations,
and any new or amended federal legislation on fracking should look to proven state
regulatory schemes for guidance. Of the many policies adopted by states, robust
disclosure requirements and burden-shifting rules are some of the most promising
resources for federal implementation.
Borrowing disclosure requirements from state regulations would help federal
legislation internalize the negative externalities of fracking. For example, Texas
employs mandatory disclosure requirements, which include the amount of water
used to frack new wells.167 Colorado’s disclosure requirements have been hailed
as the “most comprehensive in the country”168 and provide another useful strategy.
They mandate that drilling companies disclose a list of all chemical ingredients in
their fracking fluid,169 and these lists are made available online. Drilling companies
may still withhold some information about proprietary chemicals, but they must
swear under penalty of perjury that a withheld chemical is indeed proprietary170 and
must list its family and concentration.171 Federal legislation should mimic these rules
and extend them to existing wells. This would help plaintiffs verify contamination
claims, and it could also improve citizen participation in fracking policy, empower
public monitoring, assist medical professionals, aid cleanup efforts, and encourage
the use of safer chemicals.172
Federal legislation similar to the burden-shifting rules in some states would
also help internalize negative externalities. Pennsylvania’s Oil and Gas Act of 1984
presumes that fracking operators are responsible for the pollution of private water
sources within 1,000 feet of their gas well for six months after drilling is completed
if no pre-drilling water samples were taken from the private water supply.173 Similar
burden-shifting provisions in federal legislation would help internalize costs because
“rational actors who bear the costs of the harms that they cause will take all costeffective measures that are available to economize on that liability.”174 Creating the
presumption that operators are responsible for any harm caused by their actions
167. 16 Tex. Admin. Code § 3.29 (2013).
168. Mark Jaffe, Colorado Approval of Fracking Fluids’ Full Disclosure Came After Long
Negotiations and Nudge from Governor, Denver Post (Dec. 14, 2011, 1:00 AM), http://www.
denverpost.com/business/ci_19542430.
169. 2 Colo. Code Regs. § 404-1 (LexisNexis 2014).
170. Id. § 216(D)(6).
171. Id. § 205A(b)(2)(B)−(C).
172. Hannah Wiseman, Trade Secrets, Disclosure, and Dissent in a Fracturing Energy
Revolution, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 10 (2011).
173. 58 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3218(c)(1) (2014).
174. Alan O. Sykes, Strict Liability Versus Negligence in Indiana Harbor, 74 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1911, 1919 (2007).
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will incentivize both efficient market decisions and policies that internalize the cost
of damages.175
ii.

Federal Legislation Should Incorporate Existing and
Proposed Regulatory Schemes

Fracking’s negative externalities can be internalized by incorporating
strategies from existing and proposed environmental laws into new federal
legislation. Cooperative federalism has served as a cornerstone of other successful
federal legislation of pollution,176 and it should be included in any new fracking
laws. First, the EPA should set national regulatory baselines. Second, it should use
cooperative federalism with the states to enforce the federal floor and to allow for
additional, state-specific regulation.177 Mandatory monitoring systems should be
used to incentivize accurate reporting, to keep monitors operating properly, and
to prevent concealment of high levels of emissions. As in parts of the Clean Air
Act, an assumption that emissions levels are higher during gaps in monitoring
data should be considered.178 Such monitoring systems are particularly appropriate
for methane emissions, as leak prevention is relatively cheap;179 it is good for the
industry,180 local residents,181 and the environment;182 and the profits gained from
methane retention could offset or outweigh compliance costs.183 Incorporating
whistleblower protections frequently found in similar environmental legislation
175. See Hannah Coman, Balancing the Need for Energy and Clean Water: The Case for
Applying Strict Liability in Hydraulic Fracturing Suits, 39 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 131, 147
(2012).
176. For example, the CAA and CWA both employ cooperative federalism. See 42 U.S.C. §
7411(c)−(d); 33 U.S.C. § 1313.
177. Both the CAA and CWA currently use this regulatory scheme. For additional arguments in favor of cooperative federalism, see generally Cricco-Lizza, supra note 162.
178. A similar scheme is employed in the CAA monitoring under section 412(d). 42 U.S.C.
7651k(d). The EPA rule assumes that emissions are at a higher level “the longer the gap in the
recorded data and/or the lower the annual monitor availability . . . .” 58 Fed. Reg. 3590, 3635
(1993).
179. See Gerken, supra note 61, at 130−31 (“leak-tight couplings, compressors, and pumps
are inexpensive”); Susan Harvey, Vignesh Gowrishankar & Thomas Singer, Nat’l Res. Def.
Council, Leaking Profits: The U.S. Oil and Gas Industry Can Reduce Pollution, Conserve
Resources, and Make Money by Preventing Methane Waste 18 tbl.4 (2012), http://www.
nrdc.org/energy/files/Leaking-Profits-Report.pdf.
180. See Harvey et al., supra note 179, at 18 & tbl.4.
181. Pete Spotts, Fracking Study Sends Alert About Leakage of Potent Greenhouse Gas,
Christian Sci. Monitor (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2012/0213/Frackingstudy-sends-alert-about-leakage-of-potent-greenhouse-gas.
182. See Richard K. Lattanzio, Cong. Research. Serv., R42833, Air Quality Issues in
Natural Gas Systems 9 (2013) (“Methane—the principal component of natural gas—is both
a precursor to ground-level ozone formation (i.e., smog) and a potent greenhouse gas . . . .”).
183. Harvey et al., supra note 179.
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would also aid plaintiffs by facilitating the disclosure of dangerous fracking activities.184
Other common provisions—such as criminal liability for false reporting,185 bounties for
evidence leading to criminal conviction or civil penalty,186 and citizen suit provisions187—
minimize negative externalities by incentivizing compliance with regulations.
Pending and failed legislative efforts also provide useful regulatory schemes
to minimize negative externalities and to reduce pollution. Common approaches
in such legislation are to regulate fracking with the Underground Injection
Control program of the SDWA;188 to create a disclosure requirement and website
listing similar to those employed by some states;189 to mandate the disclosure of
proprietary chemicals to medical professionals during medical emergencies;190
and to require groundwater testing before, during, and after fracking.191 Other
useful regulatory schemes include eliminating the Clean Air Act’s aggregation
exemptions for oil and gas development, listing hydrogen sulfide as a hazardous
air pollutant, and permitting the EPA Administrator to list oil and gas production
wells as an area source category of hazardous air pollutants.192
Legislators should also look to industry practices and agency reports
in formulating any new laws. This includes incorporating best management
practices193 and incentivizing progressive techniques used by those in the
industry such as recycling produced wastewater194 or conducting waterless
184. Whistleblower protections are found in many environmental statutes. E.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (2012); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 660(c); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §1367; Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §9610(a); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §
300j–9(i); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6971; Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622.
185. E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(4); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2)(A).
186. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7413(f); 42 U.S.C. § 9609(d).
187. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6972; 42 U.S.C. § 7604.
188. E.g., Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act of 2013, H.R. 1921,
113th Cong. (2013).
189. E.g., id.
190. E.g., id.
191. E.g., Safe Hydration is an American Right in Energy Development Act of 2013, H.R.
2983, 113th Cong. (2013).
192. Bringing Reductions to Energy’s Airborne Toxic Health Effects Act, H.R. 1204, 112th
Cong. (2011).
193. See Richard Liroff , I nterfaith Ctr. on Corporate R esponsibility, I nvestor En vtl . H ealth N etwork , E xtracting the F acts : A n I nvestor G uide to D isclosing R isks
from H ydraulic F racturing O perations (2011), http://www.iccr.org/issues/subpages/
ExtractingTheFacts121311LR.pdf.
194. See Adam Vann, Brandon J. Murrill & Mary Tiemann, Cong. Research. Serv.,
R43152, Hydraulic Fracturing: Selected Legal Issues 8 (2014); Terry W. Roberson, Environmental Concerns of Hydraulically Fracturing a Natural Gas Well, 32 Utah Envtl. L. Rev.
67, 125–26 (2012).
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fracking.195 Particular attention should be given to the EPA’s Plan to Study the
Potential Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing on Drinking Water Resources.196 For this
study, Congress directed the EPA to “to assess the potential impacts of hydraulic
fracturing on drinking water resources and to identify the driving factors that affect
the severity and frequency of any impacts.”197 However, legislators should seek
supplemental industry and agency guidance on air impacts, ecological effects,
seismic risks, public safety, and occupational risks, as this is beyond the scope of
the study.198
Conclusion
Pollution and contamination from fracking are more than trivial negative
externalities; they harm the public health and welfare of the country. They
disproportionately burden the rural poor, who have inadequate access to justice
under the common law and extant federal laws. New or amended federal legislation
that utilizes cooperative federalism has the potential to avoid many of the pitfalls
of current legal regimes and is preferable to exclusively state-based regulation.
Comprehensive federal legislation is needed to ensure that aggrieved individuals
have their fair day in court, and it will incentivize fracking operators to internalize
many of these social and environmental costs. At a minimum, the writers of any
new fracking law should consider closing existing loopholes, or at least enough of
them so that federal regulation ensures safety at every step of the fracking process.
Legislators should look to state and federal laws for examples of proven regulatory
schemes and also to proposed legislation for potentially useful regulatory tactics.
Federal regulation has the potential to provide individuals injured by fracking with
their fair day in court, and it can ensure that the nation reaps the economic benefits
of fracking under the aegis of equitable regulation.

195. See Our Proprietary Process, GasFrac, http://www.gasfrac.com/proven-proprietaryprocess.html (Apr. 26, 2015).
196. EPA, Plan to Study the Potential Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing on Drinking
Water Resources (2011), http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/
upload/hf_study_plan_110211_final_508.pdf.
197. Id. at viii.
198. Id. at xi.
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